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Health Economics 1st Edition Bhattacharya Solutions Manual

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This is completed downloadable of Health Economics 1st Edition Bhattacharya Solutions Manual

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ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 113702996X
ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-1137029966
Author: Jay Bhattacharya (Author), Timothy Hyde (Contributor), Peter Tu (Contributor)

Comprehensive in coverage this textbook, written by academics from leading institutions, discusses current developments and debates in modern health economics from an international perspective. Economic models are presented in detail, complemented by real-life explanations and analysis, and discussions of the influence of such theories on policymaking. Offering sound pedagogy and economic rigor, Health Economics focuses on building intuition alongside appropriate mathematical formality, translating technical language into accessible economic narrative. Rather than shying away from intellectual building blocks, students are introduced to technical and theoretical foundations and encouraged to apply these to inform empirical studies and wider policymaking. Health Economics provides: – A broad scope, featuring comparative health policy and empirical examples from around the world to help students relate the principles of health economics to everyday life – Coverage of topical issues such as the obesity epidemic, economic epidemiology, socioeconomic health disparities, and behavioural economics – A rich learning resource, complete with hundreds of exercises to help solidify and extend understanding. This book is designed for advanced undergraduate courses in health economics and policy but may also interest postgraduate students in economics, medicine and health policy.

Table of Content:

1. Why health economics?
1.1 The health care economy is massive
1.2 Health is uncertain and contagious
1.3 Health economics is public finance
1.4 Welfare economics
1.5 A special note for non-American readers
I: Demand for health and health care
2. Demand for health care
2.1 Experiments on the demand for health care
2.2 Is demand for health care downward-sloping?
2.3 Measuring price sensitivity with elasticities
2.4 Does the price of health care affect health?
2.5 Conclusion
2.6 Exercises
3. Demand for health: the Grossman model
3.1 A day in the life of the Grossman model
3.2 An optimal day
3.3 Extending Grossman from cradle to grave
3.4 Comparative statics
3.5 Unifying the Grossman model
3.6 Conclusion
3.7 Exercises
4. Socioeconomic disparities in health
4.1 The pervasiveness of health inequality
4.2 The Grossman model and health disparities
4.3 The efficient producer hypothesis
4.4 The thrifty phenotype hypothesis
4.5 The direct income hypothesis
4.6 The allostatic load hypothesis
4.7 The productive time hypothesis
4.8 Time preference: the Fuchs hypothesis
4.9 Conclusion
4.10 Exercises
II: Supply of health care
5. The labor market for physicians
5.1 The training of physicians
5.2 Physician wages
5.3 Barriers to entry
5.4 Physician agency
5.5 Racial discrimination by physicians
5.6 Conclusion
5.7 Exercises
6. The hospital industry
6.1 The rise and decline of the modern hospital
6.2 The relationship between hospitals and physicians
6.3 The relationship between hospitals and other hospitals
6.4 Nonprofits and hospital production
6.5 The relationship between hospitals and payers
6.6 Conclusion
6.7 Exercises
III: Information economics
7. Demand for insurance
7.1 Declining marginal utility of income
7.2 Uncertainty
7.3 Risk aversion
7.4 Uncertainty and insurance
7.5 Comparing insurance contracts
7.6 Conclusion
7.7 Exercises
8. Adverse selection: Akerlof’s market for lemons
8.1 The intuition behind the market for lemons
8.2 A formal statement of the Akerlof model
8.3 The adverse selection death spiral
8.4 When can the market for lemons work?
8.5 Conclusion
8.6 Exercises
9. Adverse selection: the Rothschild–Stiglitz model
9.1 The IH–IS space
9.2 Indifference curves in IH–IS space
9.3 The full-insurance line
9.4 The zero-profit line
9.5 The feasible contract wedge
9.6 Finding an equilibrium
9.7 Heterogeneous risk types
9.8 Indifference curves for the robust and the frail
9.9 Information asymmetry and the pooling equilibrium
9.10 Finding a separating equilibrium (sometimes)
9.11 Can markets solve adverse selection?
9.12 Conclusion
9.13 Exercises
10. Adverse selection in real markets
10.1 Predictions of asymmetric information models
10.2 Adverse selection in health insurance
10.3 Adverse selection in other markets
10.4 What prevents adverse selection?
10.5 Conclusion
10.6 Exercises
11. Moral hazard
11.1 What is moral hazard?
11.2 A graphical representation of moral hazard
11.3 How to limit moral hazard
11.4 Evidence of moral hazard in health insurance
11.5 The tradeoff between moral hazard and risk reduction
11.6 The upside of moral hazard?
11.7 Conclusion
11.8 Exercises
IV: Economics of health innovation
12. Pharmaceuticals and the economics of innovation
12.1 The life cycle of a drug
12.2 The uncertainty and costs of drug development
12.3 Patents
12.4 Induced innovation
12.5 Regulation of the pharmaceutical industry
12.6 Conclusion
12.7 Exercises
13. Technology and the price of health care
13.1 Technology and the rise in medical expenditures
13.2 New technology and medical inflation
13.3 Technology overuse: the Dartmouth Atlas
13.4 Theories to explain the Dartmouth findings
13.5 Conclusion
13.6 Exercises
14. Health technology assessment
14.1 Cost-effectiveness analysis
14.2 Evaluating multiple treatments: the cost-effectiveness frontier
14.3 Measuring costs
14.4 Measuring effectiveness
14.5 Cost–benefit analysis: picking the optimal treatment
14.6 Valuing life
14.7 Conclusion
14.8 Exercises
V: Health policy
15. The health policy conundrum
15.1 Arrow’s impossibility theorem
15.2 The health policy trilemma
15.3 How should health insurance markets work?
15.4 How should moral hazard be controlled?
15.5 How should health care provision be regulated?
15.6 Comparing national health policies
15.7 Conclusion
15.8 Exercises
16. The Beveridge model: nationalized health care
16.1 A brief tour of the Beveridge world
16.2 Rationing health care without prices
16.3 Queuing
16.4 Health technology assessment
16.5 Competition in Beveridge systems
16.6 Injecting competition
16.7 Conclusion
16.8 Exercises
17. The Bismarck model: social health insurance
17.1 A brief tour of the Bismarck world
17.2 Health insurance markets in the Bismarck model
17.3 Containing costs with price controls
17.4 Conclusion
17.5 Exercises
18. The American model
18.1 Employer-sponsored health insurance
18.2 The managed care alternative
18.3 Medicare: universal coverage for the elderly and the severely disabled
18.4 Medicaid: subsidized coverage for the poor
18.5 Uninsurance
18.6 2010 health reform
18.7 Conclusion
18.8 Exercises
19. Population aging and the future of health policy
19.1 Why is the world aging?
19.2 Health care system sustainability
19.3 Forecasting the future of health expenditures
19.4 Policy responses to population aging
19.5 Conclusion
19.6 Exercises
VI: Public health economics
20. The economics of health externalities
20.1 Externalities in health
20.2 Pigouvian subsidies and taxes
20.3 The Coase theorem
20.4 The economics of organ transplantation
20.5 Conclusion
20.6 Exercises
21. Economic epidemiology
21.1 The demand for self-protection
21.2 The SIR model of infectious disease
21.3 Disease control
21.4 Applications of economic epidemiology
21.5 Conclusion
21.6 Exercises
22. Obesity
22.1 The widespread rise in obesity
22.2 What explains increasing obesity?
22.3 The costs of obesity
22.4 Is obesity a public health crisis?
22.5 Obesity contagion in social networks
22.6 Other justifications for public health intervention
22.7 Conclusion
22.8 Exercises
VII: Behavioral health economics
23. Prospect theory
23.1 Modeling decisions under uncertainty
23.2 Misjudging probabilities
23.3 Framing
23.4 Loss aversion
23.5 A formal introduction to prospect theory
23.6 Implications for health economics
23.7 Conclusion
23.8 Exercises
24. Time inconsistency and health
24.1 The beta-delta discounting model
24.1 The beta-delta discounting model
24.2 Time-consistent preferences
24.3 Time-inconsistent preferences: myopia and hot brains
24.4 Demand for commitment mechanisms
24.5 Behavioral welfare economics
24.6 Conclusion
24.7 Exercises
Bibliography
List of figures
List of tables
Index